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Explaining the Worldwide Decline in Military Conscription: 1970-2010

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Abstract

We empirically investigate the determinants of the decline in compulsory military service (conscription) from 1970 to 2010 using data on military conscription from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. We find that the probability of a shorter military service time is strongly associated with the percentage of the population over the age of 65 and the size of government, while the presence of political violence works in the opposite direction. Our results are robust to dynamic panel and ordered probit estimations.

JEL Codes: D72; H56

Key Words: conscription, economic freedom, ordered probit, all volunteer force

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1 Introduction

For much of modern history, forced enlistment (conscription) has been widely exercised across the world as a method of meeting states demand for military personnel. Conscription represents involuntary removal of individuals from civilian society through a compulsory requirement of younger men and women (usually 18-27 years old) to become a part of active duty military for the duration specified by the law (with certain exemptions). On the other hand, countries that largely staff their armies with volunteer professionals do not typically have compulsory military service during peacetime. In the United States, conscription was in place until 1973 when then-President Richard Nixon ended the draft.

The experience of the United States has not been unique. From the 1970s onward, conscription terms have steadily declined in duration worldwide, and many countries have abolished it entirely. The Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) annual report by Gwartney et al. (2013) includes a measure of conscription for a large number of countries going back to 1970. As an index, the EFW assigns each observed country a rating score that indicates the approximate length of compulsory military service. A rating of 10 means that a country does not use conscription at all. A country where compulsory service is in use has a score less than 10, depending on the length of the term. The longer the duration of military service, the lower the score: countries with terms of less than six months are assigned the rating of 5; between six and twelve months are assigned a rating of 3, between 12 and 18 months gets the rating of 1, and longer conscriptions periods are given a rating of zero. If conscription is technically mandated but unenforced, or if the length of military service cannot be determined, the country receives a rating of 3. If mandated military service of any length can be substituted for by compulsory civilian duty, the rating of 5 is given.

Table 1 depicts the increase in the average EFW conscription rating from 3.0 in 1970 to 6.4 in 2010, implying a significant reduction of worldwide military service terms. Virtually all

Table 1: The Decline in Conscription, 1970-2010

Year	Average World Conscription Rating
1970	3.0
1975	5.4
1980	5.5
1985	4.8
1990	4.8
1995	5.3
2000	5.8
2005	5.8
2010	6.4

Source: (Gwartney et al., 2013) and authors' calculations. Number of countries for which data is available varies by year. Higher numbers correspond to reduced use (shorter periods or elimination) of conscription for military purposes.

countries today employ some professional military personnel (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005). However, in countries that made the switch from conscript-majority forces with lengthy service duty to all-volunteer forces (AVFs) without service duty, the change was typically gradual, often including sequential shortenings of military service, military downsizing, and increased recruitment of professional personnel. This trend of military downsizing and restructuring towards AVFs was particularly prominent among many of the former Eastern Bloc countries during their NATO integrations (Jehn and Selden, 2002; Bove and Cavatorta, 2012). For example, Poland, a NATO member since 1999, had compulsory military service of two years during the Cold War and still had service of 12 months as late as 2005. In that year, conscription length was reduced to 9 months until it was ultimately phased-out in 2009. Over this period, Poland simultaneously reduced the size of its army from 180,000 to 120,000 (Day, gust).

The decline in the use of conscription for military purposes should be of great interest to economists given the role that the profession has played with respect to conscription, especially in the United States (Henderson, 2005). Henderson (2010) discusses the historical

use of conscription in the United States. Beginning in the late 1960s, economists began to study more closely the economic costs of the draft and the benefits of an AVF (Oi, 1967; Hansen and Weisbrod, 1967; Friedman, 1967; Fisher, 1969; Borcherding, 1971). This early literature generally concluded that an AVF has a lower social cost than a conscripted force (Lee and McKenzie, 1992). More recent theoretical analyses taking into account the deadweight cost of taxation necessary to fund a volunteer army, however, suggest that under certain circumstances the social cost might be higher for an AVF (Warner and Asch, 2001). Lau et al. (2004) show that once there are large dynamic costs to military conscription in terms of human capital formation that static analyses overlook. For a general overview of the economic arguments related to the military draft, see Poutvaara and Wagener (2007a).[1]

In this paper we do not address the normative economic arguments regarding conscription for military purposes. Instead, our aim is to empirically investigate the demographic and macroeconomic forces underlying the decline of the draft around the world. As early as 1970, Tollison (1970) pointed out that economists focused too much on the allocative and distributive effects of the military draft and ignored the political origins of the draft. While a number of papers in recent years have focused on the demographic, economic, and political factors underlying the use of conscription (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007b; Ng et al., 2008; Berck and Lipow, 2011), to our knowledge there have only been three empirical papers analyzing the use of conscription (Ross, 1994; Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005; Adam, 2012).

We build on their work in three ways. First, we are the first to look at the issue in a dynamic panel data setting. Second, we employ a measure of military conscription at the national level that goes beyond a dichotomous variable as employed in the literature. Our measure of the use of military conscription obtained from Gwartney et al. (2013) allows us to take into account movements towards an AVF such as reductions in the length of

[1]Economists have also looked at the effect of conscription on voting (Cebula and Mixon Jr, 2012), health and welfare (Angrist et al., 2011), and attainment and wages (Hubers and Webbink, 2015).

service. Third, we control for the percentage of a country's young that have low education levels. We argue that this variable is important for both economic and political reasons. The opportunity cost for this group to be conscripted is low and, consequently, the political cost of a draft is low. When combined with the potential for social unrest, the political benefits of conscription when this group is large seem high.

To preview our results, we find results both similar and at odds with the existing empirical literature. Most notably, we find that the population over the age of 65 is positively associated with movements to an AVF and the log of real GDP per capita is negatively related. Like the existing literature, we find democracy levels to be unrelated to the decline in conscription. With respect to our variable on the percentage of low-educated youth, we find a positive relationship between this variable and the decline in military conscription in both our standard fixed-effect results and ordered probit, but the variable is not statistically significant in a dynamic panel setting using the Arrelano-Bover estimator.

We proceed as follows. In the next section we discuss our data and empirical approach. The third section presents our main empirical results, while Section 4 provides robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.

2 Data and Empirical Approach

We begin by estimating linear reduced form models explaining a country's decision to utilize conscription for military purposes. These models take the form

$$CONSCRIPT_{it} = \alpha_c + \beta_i X'_{it} + u_{it} \tag{1}$$

where $CONSCRIPT_{it}$ is a measure indicating the degree to which country i in year t has military conscription. α_c is a country specific effect, X_{it} is a vector of characteristics of country i, and u_{it} is an unobservable equation error term which captures other factors that

affect the use of military conscription. We estimate the parameters of Equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS).

Our measure of the degree of conscription comes from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) annual report by Gwartney et al. (2013). Conscription is one of the 42 distinct variables that constitute the economic freedom of the world in the EFW index. The EFW broadly measures countries commitment to "personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, security of privately owned property, and the freedom to enter and compete in markets" (Gwartney et al., 2013).[2] The draft, in effect, represents forced labor through involuntary removal from the civilian labor force, and as such represents a violation of free choice and economic freedom.

Table 2: EFW Conscription Rating Methodology

Conscription Duration	Rating
No conscription	10
<6 months	5
6-12 months	3
12-18 months	1
>18 months	0

Source: (Gwartney et al., 2013). If conscription is mandated but not enforced, countries receive a 3. If compulsory civilian duty can be substituted, a rating of 5 is given.

The EFW does not report the length of service obligation. Rather, the authors assign each country a rating score based on a specific formula, using information obtained from two sources: *The Military Balance* by International Institute for Strategic Studies (2013) and *World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service* by War Resisters International (2005). Conscription ratings are summarized in Table 2. The EFW report currently contains data on over 150 countries and for a smaller number of countries at five-year intervals going back to 1970. In total, we have 575 total observations for up to

[2]The EFW has been used as an explanatory variable in hundreds of scholarly studies in economics, finance, political science, and many other fields.

70 countries from 1970 to 2010 observed at five-year intervals.[3]

Our explanatory variables are motivated by economic theory and the previous literature. For example, Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) present a model where conscription has a large fixed administrative cost. One prediction of their model is that countries with larger populations will be more inclined to use conscription, all else equal, as they will be able to spread the fixed costs of conscription over more people. For that reason, we include the log of each country's population. In addition to a country's population, we include the log of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as countries with higher income might find it easier to build and maintain an AVF.[4] Other things being equal, higher-income societies may find it easier to expend more resources on the relatively more expensive (in terms of direct expenditures) AVF in exchange for greater fairness, efficiency, and individual freedom.

In the literature on the military draft, demographics play a large role. In both Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) and Adam (2012), the share of the population over the age of 65 is shown to be positively associated with conscription. The elderly are presumed to exert political pressure to adopt conscription as the burden of the draft will primarily fall on the young, in comparison to an AVF that has to be financed out of the government's budget and therefore would require higher taxation or diversion of spending that could otherwise be spent on the elderly. Conversely, older individuals are less likely to want to engage in violent conflict. Thus, contrary to previous empirical work, we assume that the sign on the percentage of population 65 years old and over is ambiguous.

In addition to the elderly variable, we add the percentage of "low educated" youth. Calculated as the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 29 who have completed a primary education or less, we expect that this variable will be negatively related

[3]These countries represent a majority of the world's population. A full list of countries included in our analysis can be found in Appendix Table 1.

[4]See Ross (1994) for a further discussion of the possible mechanisms through which GDP could affect the choice between conscription and an AVF.

Table 3: Summary Statistics, 1970-2010

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	C.O.V.	Min	Max
Conscription	4.25	4.16	0.98	0.00	10.00
Log Population	16.85	1.30	0.08	14.40	21.01
% Elderly Population (65+)	8.01	5.17	0.65	2.45	22.96
Log real GDP per capita	8.35	1.52	0.18	4.79	11.10
Democracy Levels	3.61	7.00	1.94	-10.00	10.00
Alliance Membership	0.26	0.44	1.69	0.00	1.00
Political Violence	0.83	1.72	2.07	1.20	9.30
Government Size	5.62	1.61	0.29	1.20	94.75
% Low-Educated Youth (15-29)	43.76	27.06	0.62	0.42	94.75

Source: See text for data sources. N = 575, corresponding to the observations from Table 3.

to the move to an AVF.[5] We calculate this variable from well-known data set provided by Barro and Lee (2013). Our reasoning in including this variable is two-fold. First, the social costs associated with the misallocation of labor into the military under a military draft should be reduced if this percentage is higher Mulligan and Shleifer (2005). Second, the employment prospects of this group are not good and thus conscription might be utilized as a way to mitigate social unrest among this demographic.[6]

Ross (1994) controls for "central government share", which is calculated as the ratio of total central government expenditures to GNP. His reasoning for including this variable was to control for the deadweight cost of taxation in the decision to employ conscription. Countries with a larger government sector can find that the deadweight cost of the additional funding necessary to fund an AVF is too high. While Ross (1994) does not find statistically significant results, Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) found that countries with larger governments were more likely to conscript for military purposes. To measure the size of government, we employ Area 1 "Size of Government" from Gwartney et al. (2013).[7] In democratic societies,

[5]In most countries, the primary source of military personnel are those under 29.

[6]On the relationship between unemployment and civil unrest see Sayre (2009) and Oyefusi (2010).

[7]Area 1 measures size of government using four components: government consumption as a percentage of total consumption, transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, government enterprises and investment, and the top marginal income tax rate and threshold at which it applies.

public opinion carries significant weight in influencing policies regarding the use of conscription. While demographics clearly play a role, the significance of that role depends on the political structure, although the previous literature has not found an association between the type of government and the prevalence of military conscription (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005; Adam, 2012). We use the well-known data set on political regime characteristics from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2013).[8] In addition to democracy, we include membership in a military alliance (Warsaw Pact and NATO) and major episodes of political violence.[9] The idea behind military alliance membership is straightforward: countries belonging to mutual protection pacts could feel less threatened and downsize their military force, making an AVF more financially viable. Major episodes of political violence is obtained from Marshall (2015) and is measured on a 0-10 scale, with higher rates of political violence receiving higher scores.[10] Countries with higher levels of political violence are expected to have a greater demand for less costly and fast ways to mobilize troops for defense and peacekeeping. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the 575 countries included in our full specification.

3 Empirical Results

Table 4 reports results from two OLS regressions on the EFW measure of conscription on the 1970-2010 panel of five-year periods of 69 countries. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level in specification (2). Specification (1) estimates the model using country-

[8]Cited thousands of times, the data has been used in a number of papers in comparative political economy such as Coyne (2008), Leeson et al. (2012), Dutta et al. (2013), and Coyne and Williamson (2015). The variable is constructed so as to range from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). Democracy, in the Polity IV reports, has three elements: institutions through which citizens can express preferences, institutionalized constraints on the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties for all citizens in both politics and their daily lives.

[9]Countries, like Poland, that were members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO are treated the same as countries that are part of one alliance.

[10]This variable takes into account the major episodes of political violence directly present within a country that resulted in a minimum of 500 deaths. Seven categories of conflict are recognized: international violence, international war, international independence war, civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war.

fixed effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity across countries in the decision whether to utilize conscription and for how long. This include factors such as the role of ideas (which can be important as Henderson (2005) shows) that cannot be captured using a statistical model. The fixed-effect panel regressions confirm our hypothesis that the percentage of youth with a primary education is an important explanatory variable in explaining changes in conscription. The variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Economically speaking, however, the impact of the variable is small. Using the coefficient on the percentage of low-educated youth in specification 1, we find that a one-standard deviation decline in the percentage of low-educated youth is associated with a 1.37 point reduction in the length of conscription as measured by the EFW variable, other things being equal.[11] This is roughly equivalent to one-third of a standard deviation in the EFW variable.

We find that as the share of the population that is over 65 increases, countries are more likely to reduce conscription length or eliminate it entirely. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the population over 65 is associated with a 2.83 point increase on the EFW index, or roughly two-thirds of a standard deviation in the conscription measure.[12] Given the aging of the world's population that has occurred in recent decades (Chand and Tung, 2014), this is undoubtedly a large factor behind the worldwide declines in the length and use of conscription. When combined with the rise in education seen in recent decades (Hall et al., 2010), these two factors appear to be crucial to explaining the decline in conscription. Another notable result from specification (1) include the negative relationship between political violence and the decreased use of conscription for military purposes. Given that the the number of countries involved in some sort of civil war has increased throughout the last part of 20th century (Blattman and Miguel, 2010), this suggests that increased political violence has slowed the move away from conscription.

[11] 27.06 x -0.0507 = 1.371.
[12] 5.17 x 0.547 = 2.83.

Larger governments, as measured by Area 1 of the EFW, have contributed to the decline in the use of conscription. Given the aggregate nature of the government size variable, it is difficult to say exactly why this relationship exists although it likely has something to do with fiscal capacity. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) find that French legal origin countries are more likely to use the draft. They argue that this is because French legal origin countries face lower fixed and administrative costs. Since we cannot include legal origins in our panel regressions, it is possible that government size is capturing - in part - what legal origins did in their analysis. We also find that higher population countries are more likely to use the draft, something also found empirically by Mulligan and Shleifer (2005). Unlike Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), however, we do find that the log of GDP per capita is negatively related to reductions in military conscription. We also find alliance membership to be positively related to declines in the use of conscription at the 10 percent level. Similar to the previous literature we find that democracy has no effect.

In specification (2) of Table 4 we estimate the same regression using a random effects model. While the fixed effects regression is our preferred approach given the important time-invariant characteristics of countries that are not captured in our panel data model, we include the random effects both for completeness and to be comparable to some of our robustness checks that can only be estimated using random effects.[13] The random effects results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the fixed effects with the exception of the log of population and alliance membership, both of which are not statistically significant in specification (2). This is not surprising given that the random effects estimation produces smaller standard errors compared to fixed effects regressions (Allison, 2009).

4 Robustness Checks

To provide both consistent and efficient estimates in the dynamic panel setting, we employ the well-known one-step dynamic panel GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995). The results using this approach are presented in Table 5 . In linear dynamic panel models, in which the dependent variable is also a function of its lagged values, the standard within estimator is inconsistent. In such a scenario, the Arellano-Bover estimator provides for consistent estimates, and is especially suited for short (many N, few T) panel data. Linear dynamic panel models are useful in that it allows for accounting for the effect of preceding values of the dependent variable on future values.

The Arellano-Bover (AB) method produces estimates of identical direction as those of the regressions in Table 4, with minor adjustments. With AB, all independent variables except political violence, government size, and percent elderly population lose statistical significance. The magnitudes of political violence and elderly population are lower as well. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the elderly population is associated with a 1.93 point increase in the EFW conscription index, just under half a standard deviation.[14] The effect of political violence is greatly reduced, with a one standard deviation increase in that variable leading to just over one-tenth of a decrease in the EFW index (increase in conscription length).[15] The autoregressive parameter is positive and significant, indicating that a one-time positive shock leads to greater value of the EFW conscription measure (shorter periods of conscription) in future years, and that the our measure of conscription is significantly and positively driven by its past values.

As an additional robustness check we employ multinomial panel ordered probit regression in Table 6. Since the EFW conscription measure is like an ordered categorical variable,

[13] A Hausman test suggest that the fixed effects model is the appropriate model

[14] 0.375 x 5.17 = 1.93.

[15] -0.295 x 1.72 = 0.50. 0.50/4.16 = 0.12 of a standard deviation.

the use of a qualitative response model might be more appropriate. We recode the dependent variable to take values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 for conscription index values of 0, 1, 3, 5, 10, respectively.[16] The model generally takes the form

$$CONSCRIPT^*_{it} = X'\beta + u_{it} \tag{2}$$

where $CONSCRIPT^*_{it}$ is the latent (unobservable) variable that represents a country's underlying propensity to use conscription of a certain length, X' is the vector of regressors, and u_{it} is the error term. The probability we get, for example, the conscription rating of CONSCRIPT=1 is given by

$$Pr\{\delta_0 < CONSCRIPT^* = \alpha + \Sigma\beta_{it}x_{it} + u_{it} \leq \delta_1\} \tag{3}$$

$$Pr\{\delta_0 - \alpha - \Sigma\beta_{it}x_{it} < u_{it} \leq \delta_1 - -\alpha - \Sigma\beta_{it}x_{it}\} \tag{4}$$

$$= \int_{\delta_0-\alpha-\Sigma\beta_{it}x_{it}}^{\delta_1-\alpha-\Sigma\beta_{it}x_{it}} f(u)du \tag{5}$$

where $f(u)$ is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution and δ_0 and δ_1 are the threshold parameters estimated along with other parameter coefficients. Once the threshold parameter is crossed, the country chooses the duration of its military service. Becker and Kennedy (1992) provide an excellent survey of the ordered probit regression.

Our results from the random effects ordered probit regression are presented in Table 6 . Again, most variables retain the direction of the marginal effect. Democracy levels, although now exhibiting diminishing influence of the length of conscription, remain statistically insignificant. Alliance membership also changes sign, but its marginal impact is insignificant. Most importantly, however, the percentage of the population over the age of 65, government size, political violence, and the percentage of low-educated youth retain their statistical sig-

[16]For example, category 4 means military service is of zero length (no conscription), and category 0 implies duty of 18 months or more.

nificance. Interpretation of the magnitude of these effects is not as straightforward as in the previous regressions as the coefficients reflect movement from one category to the next and thus what is most important are the marginal effects of moving from one category to the next. What is important is that the results from this section indicate that several variables exhibit relative consistency across all specifications used, in terms of magnitude and direction of marginal impact. Share of population over 65 years of age and the size of government are associated with shorter duration or elimination of mandatory military service, whereas higher GDP per capita, political violence, and share of low-educated youth tend to robustly correlate with longer military service duration.

5 Conclusion

The world has changed considerably since 1970; it has generally become more open, more democratic, and more economically free along many dimensions (Gwartney, 2009; Sheehan and Young, 2014; Wolf and Young, 2014). One of those dimensions is the use of conscription for military purposes. In the paper we empirically investigated the aggregate determinants of the worldwide decline in the use of conscription. Unlike the previous literature on the determinants of conscription, we utilize a measure that accounts for changes in the length of conscription. Using OLS, multinomial probit, and the Arellano-Bover one-step dynamic panel GMM estimator, we find several results contrary to the previous literature. The percentage of the population over the age of 65 is robustly associated with a decline in the length and use of military conscription from 1970 to 2010. Similarly, the log of real GDP per capita is negatively associated with the decline in the use of conscription.

Our variable "low-educated youth" was negatively related to the decline in conscription in both the OLS panel and multinomial probit, but its statistical significance disappeared in the dynamic panel. We find that government size - as measured by Area 1 of the Economic

Freedom of the World index - is positively related to the decline in the use of conscription. While this finding is different from the finding of Ross (1994), this is not surprising given the differences in measurement. An interesting area of future research would be to investigate the effect of tax capacity on the decline in conscription, given the importance of being able to pay the higher wages necessary to fill an AVF. This is one way that we feel that our cross-country empirical results can complement case studies of individual nations experiences with conscription such as Henderson (2005) and Perri (2013).

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Table 4: OLS Regressions on EFW Conscription Measure

Dependent Variable: *Conscription Index*	Specification (1)	Specification (2)
Log Population	-1.302**	-0.325
	(-2.18)	(-0.86)
% Elderly Population (65+)	0.547***	0.439***
	(6.15)	(3.24)
Log Real GDP per capita	-1.473***	-1.642***
	(-3.25)	(-3.64)
Democracy Levels	-0.00717	-0.00635
	(-0.27)	(-0.19)
Alliance Membership	1.394*	0.468
	(1.71)	(0.68)
Political Violence	-0.194**	-0.204*
	(-2.24)	(-1.70)
Government Size	0.268***	0.265**
	(2.80)	(2.14)
% Low-Educated Youth (18-29)	-0.0507***	-0.0461***
	(-4.55)	(-2.93)
Constant	34.65***	20.40**
	(3.26)	(2.52)
F-stat. (country fixed effects)	17.37***	-
Random effects	No	Yes
Countries	69	69
Observations	575	575
R-squared (within)	0.200	0.186

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Errors are robust and clustered by country in specification (2). The dependent variable is the EFW conscription index (0, 1, 3, 5, and 10), where 0=longest mandatory conscription, and 10=no conscription. GDP is measured in constant 2005 USD.

Table 5: Regression on EFW Conscription Measure, Arellano–Bover Estimator

Dependent Variable: *Conscription Index*	(1)
Lag Conscription	0.507***
	(5.56)
Log Population	-1.540
	(-1.25)
% Elderly Population (65+)	0.375***
	(2.69)
Log Real GDP per capita	-1.331
	(-1.49)
Democracy Levels	-0.0266
	(-0.62)
Alliance Membership	0.666
	(0.76)
Political Violence	-0.295**
	(-2.53)
Government Size	0.255*
	(1.93)
% Low-Educated Youth (18-29)	-0.0222
	(-1.22)
Constant	36.13*
	(1.82)
Countries	69
Observations	521
Wald Chi-squared	167.13***

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Errors are robust and clustered by country. The dependent variable is the EFW conscription index (0, 1, 3, 5, and 10), where 0=longest mandatory conscription, and 10=no conscription. GDP is measured in constant 2005 USD.

Table 6: Ordered Probit Regression on EFW Conscription Categories

Dependent Variable: *Category*	(1)
Log Population	-0.103
	(-0.36)
% Elderly Population (65+)	0.353***
	(4.66)
Log Real GDP per capita	-0.910***
	(-3.65)
Democracy Levels	0.00111
	(0.05)
Alliance Membership	-0.130
	(-0.37)
Political Violence	-0.161**
	(-2.29)
Government Size	0.162**
	(2.10)
% Low-Educated Youth (18-29)	-0.0157**
	(-1.96)
Constant	-7.679
	(-1.37)
Countries	69
Observations	575
Log pseudolikelihood	-580.57***

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Errors are robust and clustered by country. The dependent variable is the ordered categorical indicator (0, 1, 2, 3, and 4) of length of conscription, where 0=longest mandatory conscription, and 4=no conscription. The model is a random effects panel ordered probit regression. GDP is measured in constant 2005 USD.

Table A1: Countries in the Full Data Set By Region

Africa	Asia and Oceania	Europe	Americas
Algeria	Australia	Albania	Argentina
Dem. R. Congo	China	Austria	Brazil
Cote d'Ivorie	India	Belgium	Canada
Egypt	Indonesia	Bulgaria	Chile
Ghana	Iran	Czech Rep.	Columbia
Kenya	Israel	Denmark	Ecuador
Morocco	Japan	Finland	Guatemala
Nigeria	Jordan	France	Honduras
Senegal	South Korea	Germany	Mexico
South Africa	Malaysia	Greece	Nicaragua
Tanzania	Myanmar	Hungary	Paraguay
Tunisia	Pakistan	Italy	Peru
Uganda	Philippines	Netherlands	United States
Zambia	Russia	Norway	Uruguay
Zimbabwe	Singapore	Poland	Venezuela
	Syria	Portugal	
	Thailand	Romania	
	Turkey	Spain	
	New Zealand	Sweden	
		Switzerland	
		United Kingdom	