Individualism–collectivism as an individual difference predictor of organizational citizenship behavior

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Summary

Though it appears intuitively appealing that individual differences should be related to a person’s decision to perform citizenship behaviors, the search for such individual differences has yet to yield clear results. In this study, data were collected to assess the extent of a relationship between individualism–collectivism as a within culture individual difference and self-reports of organizational citizenship behaviors. Results suggest that if an individual holds collectivistic values or norms, he/she would be more likely to perform citizenship behaviors. In addition, this relationship was found to be robust to common method effects and to the effect of the relationship between procedural justice and OCB. Implications for the way collectivistic tendencies within cultures may be used in organizations are discussed.

Introduction

Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB), which are defined as on the job behaviors which are discretionary, not formally or directly recognized by the organizational reward system, yet promote the effectiveness of the organization, have emerged as a popular area for study (Organ, 1990). Citizenship behaviors are often performed by employees to support the interests of the group or organization even though they may not directly lead to individual benefits. Examples of citizenship behaviors may range from helping a co-worker with a job-related problem even when such help is not required to wearing the company logo on a sweatshirt while attending a charity event. What is important is that both these examples describe behaviors which are helpful to the company, yet they are not behaviors considered part of the core elements of the job. Thus, managers often find it difficult to reward good citizenship directly, as well as difficult to punish directly the absence of such citizenship. A good citizen is an employee who offers support to the organization even when no such support is or can be expressly required.

OCBs are similar to prosocial organizational behavior (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986) and organizational spontaneity (George and Brief, 1992), but some important differences exist. Prosocial organizational behavior (POB) describes a broad spectrum of helping behaviors which include many OCBs. However, POB also includes behaviors which might be helpful to an individual in the organization, but would be dysfunctional to the organization (i.e. an employee might help someone cover up performance problems). Organizational spontaneity (OS) is like OCB in that it only includes functional behaviors, but OCBs are not directly recognized by the organizational reward system, while OS could be part of such a reward system.

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Of fundamental interest to OCB researchers is the search for the causes of an employee's decision to perform OCB. For example, models have been suggested linking OCB to job attitudes such as job satisfaction (Bateman and Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ and Near, 1983; Williams and Anderson, 1992), organizational commitment (Becker, 1992), and perceptions of fairness (Moorman, 1991). Additionally, OCB has been found to be related to task characteristics (Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ, 1990; Moorman and Sayeed, 1992), and interpersonal trust (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman and Fetter, 1990). Finally, recent work by Karambayya (1991) has suggested that certain contextual factors such as work unit size, stability of unit membership, and interpersonal interaction may also influence an individual's decision to perform citizenship behaviors.

However, most of these efforts to explain OCB have centered on situational causes, causes which grow from an employee's interpretation of the nature of his/her job or his/her working relationships. Missing from much of the work on OCB is an explanation based on individual differences. This line of research would suggest that OCB may be driven by a predisposition on the part of an employee to perform such discretionary, helpful behaviors regardless of the context. The purpose of this study is to explore an individual difference which may cause OCB.

The case for individual differences as a cause of OCB

It is intuitively appealing to believe that some people, because of who they are, would be more likely to exhibit OCB. In his 1990 review, Organ noted that his original conceptions of OCB grew from Barnard's (1938) description of a 'willingness to cooperate'. Barnard (1938, p. 84) also hinted that individual differences may prompt OCB when he wrote that 'the outstanding fact regarding willingness to contribute is the indefinitely large range of variation in its intensity among individuals'. Such variation would suggest that individual differences should play an important role in predicting whether an employee would offer such cooperation (Organ, 1990).

But few direct attempts to measure the relationship between individual differences and OCB have been reported (George, 1991; Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Smith et al., 1983; Williams, 1988). Most recent attempts have focused on positive affectivity (PA), a personality trait which describes an avowed zest for life and a pronounced predisposition to face a situation in a good mood (Watson and Clark, 1984). However, empirical tests designed to examine the influence of PA on OCB have provided contradictory results. Williams (1988) and Organ and Konovsky (1989) found that when PA was studied simultaneously with cognition, PA did not add to the explanation of OCB variance. On the other hand, George (1991) tested specifically the relationship between mood trait (such as PA), mood state, and OCB and found that when measured separately, mood state was related to OCB.

Given these results, the search for individual differences predictors of OCB is still unsettled. Organ (1990) has described a number of other individual difference variables which could be related to OCB including service orientation (Hogan, Hogan and Busch, 1984) and the Big Five dimensions of agreeableness and conscientiousness (McCrae and Costa, 1987). We believe an additional individual difference may be individualism–collectivism.

The case for individualism–collectivism as a predictor of OCB

Parsons and Shills (1951) suggested individualism–collectivism as a way to distinguish between individuals who are oriented more towards self-interest and reaching their own goals and individuals who are oriented toward the collective and focus more on the social system rather than
themselves (Earley, 1989). Individualism–collectivism (IC) is a bi-polar construct where an individualist (1) would consider his/her personal interests more important than the interests of a group, (2) he/she would look out for him/herself, and (3) would consider the attainment of his/her personal goals of primary importance (Earley, 1989; Wagner and Moch, 1986). On the other hand, a collectivist would allow the interests of the group to take precedence over those of the individual. A collectivist would greatly value membership in a group and would look out for the well-being of the group even at the expense of his/her own personal interests (Wagner, 1992; Wagner and Moch, 1986).

Work by Hofstede (1980) and others has suggested this dimension as a fundamental distinction between cultures. Some cultures (such as the U.S.) develop citizens who are primarily individualistic and others (such as China) develop citizens who are decidedly collectivistic. Therefore, a collectivistic society is characterized by citizens who seek to support the goals of the group and protect the group welfare, while an individualistic society is characterized by citizens who seek to promote their own interests. As an example of support for this cross-cultural view, Earley (1989, 1993) found cultural differences in social loafing which were consistent with the distinction between an individualistic and a collectivistic culture.

Though most recent work has been cross-cultural, there is some evidence to suggest that a distinction between collectivists and individualists may exist within cultures in the form of an individual difference. As noted by Hui and Triandis (1986), cultures which are labeled collectivistic or individualistic are simply cultures in which the majority of individuals have the corresponding collectivistic or individualistic individual difference. Wagner (1992), in a study of social loafing among U.S. college students, labeled the variable individualism–collectivism, but it was clear he was discussing an individual difference, not a cultural influence. In addition, Earley (1989, 1993) measured individualism–collectivism directly and did not merely rely on country or culture to indicate the degree the respondents were either individualistic or collectivistic. This measurement strategy suggests that even though overall trends may exist within cultures towards one dimension or the other, there still may be variance within a culture which could predict changes in dependent variables of interest.

This was the focus of the present paper. We studied IC within one culture and examined whether this individual difference could explain variance in dimensions of organizational citizenship behavior. For simplicity sake, we will follow Wagner (1992) and refer to individuals as individualistic–collectivistic within a culture.

The relationship between individualism–collectivism and OCB

Given that IC can vary within a culture, could this individual difference predict OCB? Since collectivists have the goal of promoting the welfare of the group, it makes sense that IC would be related to behaviors such as OCBs which greatly aid that goal. As Earley (1989, p. 567) has noted, an attribute of collectivistic societies (i.e. those which promote collectivistic values in their members) is that 'individuals will subordinate their personal interests to the goals of their collective ... a driving force within a collectivistic culture is cooperation so as to attain group goals and safeguard welfare'. Since OCBs are behaviors which support the well-being of the collective and since OCBs usually require the subordination of self-interest, we would expect to find that employees who indicate more collectivistic tendencies would be more likely to perform OCBs.

Support for a general relationship between IC and OCB could also come from recent work supporting a relationship between procedural fairness and OCB. Following the group value model of procedural justice developed by Lind and Tyler (1988), Moorman, Niehoff and Organ
(1993) suggested that one reason procedural fairness perceptions were related to citizenship behaviors is that procedural fairness promotes a concern for the welfare of the group in which the employee is working. Citizenship behavior, which is defined by Graham (1989) as behavior which supports the collective rather than individual self-interest, has been shown as a likely means of reciprocating fair procedures because it is discretionary behavior which supports the collective’s interests (Moorman, 1991). If the key to the relationship between procedural justice and OCB is the way fair procedures engender a sensitivity toward the welfare of the group, it makes sense that such sensitivity may also grow from an employee’s orientation towards collectivism.

Effects of IC on the different dimensions of OCB

Beyond a general relationship between IC and OCB, we also can suggest more specific relationships between IC and the dimensions of OCB. Work with the dimensionality of OCB provides a basis for suggesting that some OCB dimensions may be related to IC more than others. Graham (1989) has proposed a four-dimension model of OCB and she suggested that there may be different causes for different dimensions. Her four dimensions of OCB are (1) interpersonal helping, which focuses on helping co-workers in their jobs when such help was needed, (2) individual initiative, which describes communications to others in the workplace to improve individual and group performance, (3) personal industry, which describes the performance of specific tasks above and beyond the call of duty, and (4) loyal boosterism, which describes the promotion of the organizational image to outsiders.

Though all four dimensions describe citizenship behaviors, they may differ in the degree they represent behaviors that are extra-role and not linked to contingent rewards. George and Brief (1992) suggest that the OCB dimension called conscientiousness is one which could easily be construed as in-role. They note that the focus of conscientiousness is ‘on rule adherence and, thus, on prescribed role behaviors … We find it more parsimonious to construe conscientiousness as representing a high facet of job performance rather than as a form of voluntary action’ (p. 312).

Since Graham’s dimension of personal industry parallels conscientiousness, we believe the same concern would hold for personal industry as well. We feel the other three OCB dimensions can more easily be distinguished from in-role behavior and the motivation of their performance would depend more so on factors outside one’s self-interest. These dimensions would thus more likely be performed by collectivists rather than by individualists. However, because it is more in line with in-role behavior, both individualists and collectivists might find reasons to perform personal industry.

Given this potential difference between personal industry and the other three OCB dimensions, we offer the following hypothesis:

IC (as measured by higher IC scores indicating more of a collectivistic orientation) will be positively related to the OCB dimensions of interpersonal helping, individual initiative, and loyal boosterism.

Method

Sample

Surveys containing measures of IC and OCBs and our assurances that their responses would
be confidential were distributed to 210 employees of a southeastern financial services organization. A total of 185 surveys were returned for a response rate of 88 per cent. Using listwise deletion, 155 surveys were used to create a covariance matrix. Eighty per cent of the respondents were females and the average respondent age was 36.5 years with a standard deviation of 12.2. Respondents had been with the organization an average of 6.7 years (S.D. = 7.3) and had been in their present job 3.5 years (S.D. = 4.1). Conversations with firm officers indicated that the demographic makeup of the respondents was similar to the demographic makeup of the employees as a whole.

**Measures**

**Organizational citizenship behavior**

OCB was assessed with self-reports using the four dimensional scale described in more detail in Moorman and Blakely (1992). This scale was based on Graham’s (1989) dimensions of OCB, but contained items which referenced Organ’s (1988) dimensions, as well. We created a new scale using Graham’s dimensionality because (1) her OCB dimensions corresponded closely with political science theory on social citizenship and (2) items for her dimensions could be designed to incorporate much of the meaning of Organ’s (1988) five factor model used in other OCB research (cf. MacKenzie, Podsakoff and Fetter, 1991; Moorman, 1991; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993).

In developing the scale, 49 items measuring interpersonal helping, individual initiative, personal industry, and loyal boosterism were first evaluated by performing Q-sort analyses using 14 colleagues in our business school. Items which were placed in dimensions other than their hypothesized dimension were modified or replaced. Then the 49 preliminary items were pretested by administering them to members of both undergraduate and graduate business classes (n = 111). Results from the factor analyses of this pretest data were used to refine the measure to 20 items, which loaded significantly on their hypothesized factors. In this final list, five items described each of the four dimensions. This 20-item scale was then administered to the present sample.

Confirmatory factor analyses (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989) were used to assess the fit of the data to the hypothesized measurement model. Based on the results of the analyses, 19 items were used to describe the four dimensions suggested by Graham (1989) and referenced earlier in this paper. The 19 items were chosen because the data for these items fit the model well, they all had significant loadings on their hypothesized factor, and had no significant cross-loadings. The fit of the data to the hypothesized model was determined using two fit indices which, unlike $\chi^2$, have been found to be resistant to the effects of sample size. The two fit indices used were the Confirmatory Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) (Tucker and Lewis, 1973). The CFI for the OCB model was 0.91 and the TLI was 0.90. Our final measure, reported in Table 1, had a $\chi^2$ score of 229.21 for 145 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$) and contained five interpersonal helping items, five individual initiative items, four personal industry items, and five loyal boosterism items.

**Individualism–collectivism**

IC was measured with Wagner and Moch’s (1986) 11-item scale. The Wagner and Moch scale operationalizes IC as the difference between the focus on self versus group interests in a group context. Wagner and Moch identified three structural dimensions of IC. The first was called beliefs and measured statements of truth or fact as they relate to whether the work group is perceived more productive or efficient when members are more or less collectivistic. The
second dimension was called values and measured the respondent’s general preferences about working in a more collectivistic environment versus a more individualistic environment. The third dimension was called norms and measured the respondent’s specific prescriptions for the behavior of other work group members. These prescriptions described either individualistic or collectivistic work behaviors.

In this study, higher scores on each item were scored to reflect the respondent’s orientation toward collectivistic tendencies, where lower scores reflected more individualistic tendencies. Wagner (1992) reported reliabilities for this scale which were all above 0.75 and Wagner and Moch (1986) provided evidence for its construct validity.

Since a three-factor measurement model has been supported in past work with the scale, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses to determine if our data fit the hypothesized measurement model. Our results support the hypothesized factor structure. The confirmatory factor analyses of the 11 items resulted in a three-factor model with a CFI of 0.92, a TLI of 0.90, and a \( \chi^2 \) score of 80.49 for 41 degrees of freedom (\( p < 0.001 \)). All the items loaded significantly on their hypothesized factors. The specific items are noted in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Standardized ( \lambda )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal helping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goes out of his/her way to help co-workers with work-related problems</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily helps new employees settle into the job</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently adjusts his/her work schedule to accommodate other employees’ requests for time-off</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always goes out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shows genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For issues that may have serious consequences, expresses opinions honestly even when others may disagree</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often motivates others to express their ideas and opinions</td>
<td>0.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages others to try new and more effective ways of doing their job</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages hesitant or quiet co-workers to voice their opinions when they otherwise might not speak-up</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently communicates to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely misses work even when he/she has a legitimate reason for doing so</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performs his/her duties with unusually few errors</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performs his/her job duties with extra-special care</td>
<td>0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always meets or beats deadlines for completing work</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal boosterism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defends the organization when other employees criticize it</td>
<td>0.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages friends and family to utilize organization products</td>
<td>0.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defends the organization when outsiders criticize it</td>
<td>1.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shows pride when representing the organization in public</td>
<td>0.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively promotes the organization’s products and services to potential users</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CFI = 0.91, TLI = 0.90, \( \chi^2 = 229.21 \) with 145 df.
All of the factor loadings in this table are significant at or below \( p = 0.05 \).
Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis of the individualism–collectivism scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Standardized λ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My work group is more productive when its members do what they want to do rather than what the group wants them to do (R)</td>
<td>1.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My work group is most efficient when its members do what they think is best rather than what the group wants them to do (R)</td>
<td>1.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My work group is more productive when its members follow their own interests and concerns (R)</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I prefer to work with others in my work group rather than work alone</td>
<td>0.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given the choice, I would rather do a job where I can work alone rather than do a job where I have to work with others in my work group (R)</td>
<td>1.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like it when members of my work group do things on their own, rather than working with others all the time (R)</td>
<td>0.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my work group should be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of the work group (such as working late now and then, going out of their way to help, etc.)</td>
<td>0.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my work group should realize that they sometimes are going to have to make sacrifices for the sake of the work group as a whole</td>
<td>0.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my work group should recognize that they are not always going to get what they want</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should be made aware that if they are going to be part of a work group, they are sometimes going to have to do things they don’t want to do</td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my work group should do their best to cooperate with each other instead of trying to work things out on their own</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.90, χ² = 80.49 with 41 df.  
All of the factor loadings in this table are significant at or below p = 0.05.

**Primary analyses**

In order to test our hypotheses, we decided to assess the significance of the relationships between IC and OCB with structural equation modeling using LISREL 7 (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989). A two-step process for determining the relationships between the latent variables was followed (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). First, an overall measurement model which includes the indicators of all the latent variables was evaluated. The purpose of this model was to assess the discriminant validity between the independent and dependent variables.

Then a full structural model based on the confirmatory model was evaluated. In this structural model, 12 direct paths between the three IC dimensions and the four OCB dimensions were evaluated. This structural model is diagrammed in Figure 1.

**Secondary analyses**

Since all the variables were measured at the same time and form the same person, concern over the effects of common method variance was warranted (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In order to offer some assurance that the relationships found were not the result of common method bias, a second model was assessed which included a common method factor. This common method model differs from the structural model in that a 'method' latent variable is added. All the items which originate from the same source are then double loaded onto its
Figure 1. Full structural model showing the measurement model plus the structural paths from each of the three dimensions of collectivism to each of the four dimensions of OCB (12 paths total).

substantive latent variable and the method variable as well. If the paths which were found to be significant remained significant in this final model, we could offer support that the relationships found were robust to common method effects. This technique is described in more detail in Podsakoff et al. (1990) and in Williams and Anderson (1992).

Additionally, a last model was evaluated which tested whether the relationships found between IC and OCB would hold controlling for the effects of procedural justice on OCB. Though our intent was not to reexamine the relationship between procedural justice and OCB, we believed that the importance of any relationships found for IC would be bolstered if we could show that IC predicted OCB independent of a procedural justice effect. We chose procedural justice as the variable with which to compare IC because procedural justice has been found to be related to OCB in a number of studies (Moorman, 1991; Moorman et al., 1993; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993) and we suggested earlier that the reasons why IC could be related to OCB might be similar to the reasons for a relationship between procedural justice and OCB. Therefore, eight items reflecting procedural justice from the procedural justice scale used in Moorman (1991) and Niehoff and Moorman (1993) were used to test if IC was related to OCB controlling for the effects of procedural justice.
Results

Primary analyses

Overall confirmatory model
An overall confirmatory model offering support for the discriminant validity of a three-factor model of IC and a four-factor model of OCB was assessed. The fit of this model was adequate with a CFI of 0.90, a TLI of 0.89, and a $\chi^2$ of 528.08 with 381 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). In addition, all indicators loaded significantly on their hypothesized latent variables and no significant cross-loadings existed.

Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlations
Scale means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations are reported in Table 3. Three points deserve mention. First, the correlations between the three dimensions of IC were very low and none were significant. While this may call to question the likelihood that the three dimensions are measuring part of the same construct, these correlations are in line with those found in past research using the scale. For example, in their article supporting the construct validity of their scale, Wagner and Moch (1986, p. 293) explained why the correlations between the three dimensions were small by noting that they expected 'considerable "slippage"' between the degree respondents hold similar beliefs, norms, and values. They also note that beliefs and norms appeared to be relatively independent.

Second, the correlations between OCB dimensions are significant and reasonably high (0.38 to 0.49). However, these are lower than reported by other OCB scales (cf. Podsakoff et al., 1990; Moorman, 1991), which suggests that this scale does a better job of separating OCB dimensions. Third, correlations between dimensions of IC and dimensions of OCB exist, suggesting, at least on the zero order level, partial support for the general hypothesis that IC as an individual difference and OCB are related.

In addition, we should note that the reliabilities for the indicators of IC values and personal industry are below the 0.70 level recommended by Nunnally (1978). While this is troubling in terms of the construct validity of the measures used, we believe the use of LISREL can help to offset this lack of reliability to some degree. An advantage of LISREL over regression analyses is that when calculating the structural relationships between latent variables, LISREL takes into account the measurement error inherent in survey research. The damage of using scales with reliabilities less than 0.70 is lessened by the fact that we are not then assuming that the measures were perfectly reliable (as is the case with regression) (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989).

Significance of individual paths
In order to examine any relationships between the individual dimensions of collectivism and the dimensions of OCB, the parameters of the structural paths in the full structural model were assessed. Before testing for any effects based on common method, six paths were found to be significant at or below the 0.05 level. First, the paths from collectivistic values to interpersonal helping ($p < 0.01$), individual initiative ($p < 0.05$), and loyal boosterism ($p < 0.01$) were significant. Second, paths from collectivistic norms to interpersonal helping ($p < 0.05$), individual initiative ($p < 0.05$), and personal industry ($p < 0.05$) were also significant. Finally, no significant paths were found between collectivistic beliefs and any of the four OCB dimensions. The standardized solution for the full structural model is reported in Table 4.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlations for individual-collectivism and OCB scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beliefs</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Values</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Norms</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Interpersonal helping</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Individual initiative</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.19†</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Personal industry</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.40*</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Loyal boosterism</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Procedural justice</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18†</td>
<td>0.21†</td>
<td>0.17†</td>
<td>0.46*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All scales used a 7-point Likert format.
* p < 0.01;
† p < 0.05.

Table 4. Parameter estimates for the paths in three models: the full structural model, the model controlling for a method factor, and the model controlling for procedural justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path description</th>
<th>Standardized path est.</th>
<th>Controlling for method factor</th>
<th>Controlling for procedural justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs ↔ Interpersonal helping</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs ↔ Individual initiative</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs ↔ Personal industry</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs ↔ Loyal boosterism</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values ↔ Interpersonal helping</td>
<td>0.293*</td>
<td>0.283*</td>
<td>0.278*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values ↔ Individual initiative</td>
<td>0.206†</td>
<td>0.200†</td>
<td>0.207†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values ↔ Personal industry</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values ↔ Loyal boosterism</td>
<td>0.270*</td>
<td>0.240*</td>
<td>0.198†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms ↔ Interpersonal helping</td>
<td>0.206†</td>
<td>0.200†</td>
<td>0.209†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms ↔ Individual initiative</td>
<td>0.182†</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.197†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms ↔ Personal industry</td>
<td>0.264†</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms ↔ Loyal boosterism</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.01;  † p < 0.05.

Secondary analyses

Assessment of common method effects

However, before any conclusions can be drawn from the results reported above, a third model which included a common method factor was evaluated. This model contained all the indicators and latents of the previous structural model, except the indicators for the latents were double loaded onto a method factor. Therefore, any shared variance based on the source of the rating would be controlled when assessing the significance of the structural paths.

Our results suggest that common method variance had some effect on the significance of the paths from the IC dimensions to the OCB dimensions, but four of the six paths found to be significant in the full structural model maintained their significance. Specifically, the paths from values to interpersonal helping (p < 0.01), from values to individual initiative (p < 0.05), from values to loyal boosterism (p < 0.01), and from norms to interpersonal helping (p < 0.05) remained significant after the method factor was included. The paths from norms to individual initiative and from norms to personal industry were weakened to the point where
they were not significantly different from zero. The standardized coefficients for the paths measured are reported in Table 4.

Assessment of IC Effects Controlling for Procedural Justice
As a final test of the strength of the relationships found between IC and OCB, we tested a model which evaluated the paths between IC and OCB while controlling for the effects of procedural justice on OCB. To assess the efforts of IC while controlling for procedural justice, we evaluated a new model which added a procedural justice latent variable and structural paths from procedural justice to the OCB dimensions. If the paths between IC and OCB remained significant, we could offer support for the unique importance of IC as a predictor of OCB.

The procedural justice variable was measured using eight items from the procedural justice scale reported in Moorman (1991). The mean for the procedural justice items was 5.0 (out of 7), the standard deviations was 1.17, and the coefficient alpha was 0.94. Measurement error was approximated by fixing the factor loading to equal the square root of the coefficient alpha and by fixing the random error variance to the product of the variance of scale score and the quantity of one minus the coefficient alpha. This technique has been explained in Kenny (1979) and Williams and Anderson (1992) and has been shown to be a reasonable approximation for the error variance by Netemeyer, Johnston and Burton (1990).

The results of this final LISREL model suggest that the effects found between IC and OCB remain even after controlling for the effects of procedural justice. Similar to the previous analyses, significant paths (p < 0.05) existed between values and interpersonal helping, values and individual initiative, and values and loyal boosterism. Significant paths also existed between norms and interpersonal helping, and between norms and individual initiative. These paths are reported in Table 4. In addition to these paths, significant paths were also found between procedural justice and three OCB dimensions: individual initiative (p < 0.05), personal industry (p < 0.05), and loyal boosterism (p < 0.001).

We should note that since we needed to use a single scale score to indicate procedural justice, we were unable to test for the influence of common method variance in this model. However, since the paths between IC and OCB were found to be robust to common method variance in the model preceding this, we see little reason why this condition would not hold here as well.

Discussion
In this study, we tested for a relationship between individualism–collectivism as an individual difference variable and the performance of organizational citizenship behaviors. Our results, in general, support IC as a predictor of OCB. After separately controlling for the effects of common method variance and for the effects of the relationship between procedural justice and OCB, we found evidence of relationships between collectivistic values and the OCB dimensions of interpersonal helping, individual initiative, and loyal boosterism, and evidence of a relationship between collectivistic norms and interpersonal helping. Though evidence of other individual relationships was found, only those relationships reported above withstood the effects of common method variance and procedural justice. We believe these results provide support for Earley’s (1989) contention that collectivists are more likely to seek ways to aid the welfare of the group even though such aid is not directly related to their individual interest. OCBs may become a type of work behavior which collectivists would choose to perform because OCBs are considered helpful to the group even if they are not required.
In addition, work with the relationship between procedural justice and OCB has suggested that a key to an employee's decision to perform OCBs may depend on the degree the organization has taken steps to promote in the employee a strong concern for the welfare of the group. Fair procedures were offered as one way in which such concern could be created. However, our results here offer another source of this concern — an individual difference measuring the degree a person is individualistic or collectivist — and this source predicted OCB independent of any effect between procedural justice and OCB. Past work with IC has noted that collectivists show a strong concern for the welfare of the group and will often subordinate their self-interest for the good of the group (Earley, 1989). We suggest here that OCB may be a form of work performance which collectivists will use to show that concern. Employees who are collectivistic may go beyond their in-role requirements and offer examples of interpersonal helping, individual initiative, and loyal boosterism as a way to help the group.

However, we also found that not all OCB dimensions were related to collectivism. Personal industry, which describes the performance of an employee's specific tasks above and beyond the call of duty, differed from the other three dimensions of OCB in that it was not related to IC. This finding offers support to the view that central to the difference between individualists and collectivists is the degree they will perform acts which may not directly serve their self-interest. Thus, the difference between how individualists and collectivists view an OCB dimension may depend on the ease in which the dimension could be considered in-role. Past work has suggested that, of the four OCB dimensions, personal industry is the one which could be most confounded with behavior which directly leads to contingent rewards (George and Brief, 1992). Given this, individualists could perform personal industry behaviors because they believe they will be rewarded for doing so and thus no difference between the degree individualists and collectivists perform this dimension would exist.

However, the lack of a relationship between IC and personal industry does not preclude other individual difference variables from having an effect. For example, the Big Five dimension labeled 'Conscientiousness', which describes a diligent focus on work (McCrae and Costa, 1987), could easily be related to personal industry, but would not so neatly predict the other OCB dimensions. Similarly, one's need for achievement (McClelland, 1961) could also uniquely affect personal industry, as well. These and other individual difference variables were cited by Organ (1990) as potential predictors and should be examined as well.

The relationship between IC and the OCB dimension of loyal boosterism merits further examination. The results support a relationship between values and loyal boosterism, but not between norms and loyal boosterism. One possible explanation for this is that, unlike interpersonal helping or individual initiative, loyal boosterism focuses on promoting the organization in general rather than a particular work group. Given that IC also focuses on the work group, one might question whether a relationship between an organizational level construct such as loyal boosterism and a group level construct such as IC could ever relate. For example, an individual may be very supportive of his or her own work group, but still do little to defend the organization when outsiders criticize it. We believe the key to the relationships between values, norms, and OCB is the degree to which either IC norms or values can generalize to general attitudes towards organizations. In retrospect, since IC norms focus on specific prescriptions about what is best for work groups while IC values focus on more general personal preferences, finding a relationship between IC values and loyal boosterism but no relationship between IC norms and loyal boosterism is understandable. It may simply be that IC values capture better the general orientation of the respondent toward collectivism and these values would hold for the work group and the organization. More specific items such as those in norms (and even more so in beliefs) might be less likely to generalize.
One additional finding that deserves mention was the lack of any relationship between the IC dimension of beliefs and the OCB dimensions. Although we had expected to find a relationship between all three dimensions of IC and the three OCB dimensions, there was no relationship between IC beliefs and any of the OCB dimensions, even before taking into account common method effects. In retrospect, this lack of a relationship is not surprising. First, consistent with previous research (Wagner and Moch, 1986), the beliefs, values, and norms dimensions of IC are uncorrelated in the present study. Second, the items contained in the beliefs dimension are beliefs about statements of fact regarding group performance. For example, one of the items is ‘My work group is more productive when its members do what they want to do rather than what the group wants them to do’. Since these items seem more to reflect judgments about the group, rather than the individual’s orientation toward individualism or collectivism, one’s collectivistic tendencies could easily be different from his or her beliefs about the group.

On the other hand, value and norm items more clearly tap individual preferences. For example, one value item reads, ‘I prefer to work with others in my work group rather than work alone’ (emphasis added). One norm item reads, ‘People in my work group should recognize that they are not always going to get what they want’ (emphasis added). We believe that by including words such as prefer and should, value and norm items are better able to assess the individual’s tendencies to behave individualistically or collectivistically. Such words may be better at evoking the respondents’ preferences about how a work group should function, not merely their observations. Therefore, the lack of any relationship between beliefs and OCB is somewhat understandable.

*Management implications of this research*

What is especially encouraging about these results is that we have found evidence supporting an individual difference correlate to citizenship behavior. Employees who have a tendency to support the welfare of the collective appear more likely to perform the small, discretionary, yet helpful acts which in the aggregate promote the effective functioning of the work group or organization. As well, collectivists may behave somewhat invariantly in their performance of OCB and may strive to perform citizenship behaviors even when situational causes may not be so conducive.

We believe these findings provide some support for Organ’s (1990) view that disposition is important in predicting OCB. Organ suggests that dispositional causes primarily drive an employee’s OCB in the early stages of employment until that employee is able to appraise the type of exchange (either social or economic) which defines his/her relationship with the organization. At that point, the relationship between disposition and OCB would be moderated by the employee’s perception of the fairness of that exchange. Employees with strong dispositional tendencies towards OCB (i.e. collectivists) who believe their social exchange relationship with the organization is fair would be most likely to exhibit OCB. As well, employees with weak dispositional tendencies towards OCB (i.e. individualists) who believe their social exchange relationship with the organization is unfair would be least likely to exhibit OCB. Since work by Konovsky and Folger, (1991), Moorman (1991), Moorman et al. (1993), and Niehoff and Moorman (1993) support the importance of fairness perceptions in predicting OCB, future research might find fruitful a test for the presence of a moderating relationship between collectivism, fairness perceptions, and organizational citizenship behavior.

One implication of this relationship between collectivism and OCB is that, as Wagner (1992) pointed out, most U.S. organizations are set up to motivate and reward the individualist. Collectivistic tendencies may be valued by the organization, yet few attempts are made to manifest them. Organizations may go so far as to suppress the interests of collectivists through individualized reward systems and performance appraisal.
However, many new and emerging management techniques which are based in more collectivistic concerns are becoming popular. Presently, there is increased emphasis on participatory management and team-based manufacturing systems (e.g. TQM, employee involvement programs, quality circles) and many cite these programs as the future of U.S. business (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992; Lawler, 1992). Yet, one might be skeptical about implementing such collectivistic programs in our individualistic culture. However, as we have noted here, there is variance in collectivism within even the most individualistic culture and companies may find it helpful to design programs which attempt to take advantage of this heretofore nascent trait.

In addition, since Karambayya (1991) has shown that OCBs contribute to the effectiveness of the work unit, a focus on collectivism may help the organization realize the full benefits of cooperation. Our results specifically suggest that by supporting employees with collectivistic tendencies, organizations may benefit from OCBs.

**Limitations and future research**

Even though we feel confident with our results, several limitations deserve discussion. Our first and greatest concern is that we collected data from only one source and at only one time. We statistically controlled for a method effect and found that two paths between IC and OCB were rendered nonsignificant by this test. Though these two paths represented 1/3 of our significant results, we believe our control for common method variance strengthened our confidence in the significance of the remaining paths.

Even so, it would still be better to measure OCBs from another source as a check. Work on the use of survey instruments has long decried the use of self-reports alone (cf. Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), but in our case, no other sources of data were made available. We believe one of the best ways to assess OCB performance would be to triangulate, possibly using self-, supervisory, and co-worker ratings. However, given the lack of inter-rater reliabilities in performance assessments, even using multiple sources would potentially present difficulties. For example, a meta-analysis by Harris and Schaubroeck (1988) found a limited relationship between the three sources of performance assessment. Multiple sources may be the best method, but still might not yield accurate results.

Secondly, even though the data are cross-sectional, we make causal inferences about the relationships between IC and OCB. LISREL allows for an assessment of directionality in cross-sectional data, however other models may also explain the data equally as well. Longitudinal designs which can better test for causality are still needed.

Thirdly, our sample is predominantly female (80 per cent) and this may limit the extent to which we can generalize our results. However, we believe this is a lesser concern because work examining gender differences and OCB have not provided conclusive results saying that men and women differ in their OCB performance.

One final issue which we believe would be a fruitful avenue for future research is the concern over whether OCB could ever exist for a collectivist. It may be that collectivists view OCBs as part of their job rather than extra-role. Our intent is not to say that collectivists would not perform OCBs. In fact, our research suggests that the behaviors which make up OCB would be more likely performed. Instead, our concern is whether those behaviors which characterize OCB would be considered as extra-role, rather than as part of the job, for a collectivist. For an individualist, the distinction between in-role and extra-role behavior may be very clear. Those behaviors not explicitly recognized by the organizational reward system are extra-role. However, for a collectivist, seemingly extra-role behaviors may instead be considered 'part of the job' and thus the reasons historically cited for OCB performance may not hold. Indeed,
Morrison (1993) reported that individuals who defined their jobs more broadly to include extra-role behaviors were more likely to perform those behaviors. Collectivists may perform OCBs simply because they may be more likely to see them as 'part of the job' and not as 'extra' behaviors. Research on the reasons for the relationship between IC and OCB, including research on the degree collectivists see OCB as in-role, is needed to clarify this issue.

**Conclusion**

Although any conclusions must be tempered by the preceding limitations, one conclusion we can draw from this research is that individual differences do, to some degree, predict OCB. Though past work with positive affect as a predictor of OCB has shown that OCB can originate from both the persons and the situation, other work has supported more of a situational perspective. We believe that future research in OCB should focus on the ways both dispositional and situational causes influence OCB. The major difficulty is to find the optimal combination of dispositional and situational factors which would cause the most effective performance of OCB.

**References**


Moorman, R. H. and Sayeed, L. (1992). 'Can using computers promote organizational citizenship: A study relating computer usage, task characteristics, and OCB'. Unpublished manuscript, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV.